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Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Value: 
Disaggregating the effects on cash flow, risk and growth  
 
 
This paper investigates the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm value and 
seeks to identify the source of that value, by disaggregating the effects on forecasted 
profitability, long term growth and the cost of capital.  The study explores the possible risk 
(reducing) effects of CSR and their implications for financial measures of performance. For 
individual dimensions of CSR, in general strengths are positively valued and concerns are 
negatively valued, although the effect is not universal across all dimensions of CSR. We 
show that these valuation effects are principally driven by CSR performance associated with 
better long run growth prospects, with an additional minor contribution made by a lower cost 
of equity capital.  
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Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Value: 
Disaggregating the effects on cash flow, risk and growth  
 
Introduction  
As many preceding papers have discussed, there is conflicting evidence on whether, and to 
what extent, corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (or the lack of them) affect a 
firm’s financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Renneboog et 
al., 2008; van Beurden and Gossling, 2008; Margolis et al., 2009). There are many 
conceivable reasons as to why the evidence varies. These could relate to the context, e.g. the 
time, country, and industry, or differences in the dimensions of CSR observed. Moreover, 
disparities might be attributed to variation in methodological approaches. In the latter case, 
one reason for variation can be differences in the financial measures applied.  Many studies 
have used accounting measures such as Return on Investment or Return on Equity (Orlitzky 
et al., 2003; Margolis et al., 2009) and whilst such measures have their use, they are 
backward looking and their objectivity and informational value can be questioned (Benston, 
1982). Stock market measures, by contrast, are forward looking with expectations of future 
cash flows embedded within the stock price, and they are more relevant for considering the 
implications of CSR for investors.  
 
The market measure most commonly used to consider the financial performance of CSR is 
stock market returns (Margolis et al., 2009). However such studies can produce misleading 
results because, in an efficient market, returns would be expected to reflect only changes in 
corporate social performance (CSP).  If levels of CSP remain unchanged or if changes in CSP 
are relatively small for a firm for some time, then a returns based study can give the wrong 
impression that CSP does not affect financial performance. This is pertinent given some 
evidence to suggest that CSP measures are sticky. For example, Gregory and Whittaker 
(forthcoming) note that for any given year there is a significantly high correlation between 
the current CSP and lagged CSP, and that these correlations are higher for larger firms. 
Furthermore, even when returns based studies indicate some financial impact from CSR 
strategies, care needs to be taken in the interpretation of the results, following recent studies 
by Sharfman and Fernando (2008) and El Ghoul et al. (2011) which suggest that firms with a 
high level of CSP may enjoy a lower cost of capital. Their findings raise questions regarding 
the implications of high CSR firms generating lower returns over the long run. Is such an 
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effect because the firms were poorly managed, or rather, is it the case that realised low 
returns are the consequence of CSR strategies lowering the ex ante cost of capital?   
 
Specifically, the long run returns to firms with high CSR, could be lower for a given expected 
future cash flow simply because they are subject to less market risk, and not the consequence 
of poor management.  Therefore, if CSR does lower a firm’s cost of capital, focusing solely 
on returns to indicate the financial impact of CSR might be misleading. To understand the 
total financial implications of CSP it is therefore necessary for attention to be given to both 
stock returns and firm value.  Relatively few studies have based their estimations on firm 
value but recent studies that have used this concept (Guenster et al., 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 
2011; Kim and Statman, 2012; Gregory and Whittaker (forthcoming)) find evidence of CSR 
indicators being positively related to firm value. In this paper we extend this literature with an 
investigation of the means by which CSR strategies might impact on value. 
 
A focus on firm value is highly relevant to investors, but it is also pertinent to know more 
about the source of that value, and specifically, the extent to which it emanates from its two 
main components, expected future cash flows and the cost of capital.  Using the model 
presented in Gregory and Whittaker (forthcoming), which offers a means of testing the 
relationship between CSR indicators and firm value in a more theoretically robust manner 
than the employment of Tobin’s Q, we attempt to separate the effect of each on firm value, 
and simultaneously contribute to the debate on how CSR impacts on risk. We draw on 
literature from the resource-based perspective and stakeholder theory to embark on 
disentangling how CSR strategies might affect cash flows (including firm-specific risk) and 
cost of capital (and thereby systematic risk). In addition, given that high CSR firms may incur 
higher initial costs when they invest in CSR, but perform better in the longer term than low 
CSR firms (Russo and Fouts, 1997; Barnett, 2007; Sharfman and Fernando, 2008), we 
examine expected (forecasted) earnings to identify differences in expected (forecasted) 
profitability, together with long term growth expectations, and analyse their bearing on firm 
value.   We also investigate realised returns as a way of identifying the way that risk 
exposures vary with CSR strategies, and further employ the Easton et al. (2002) mode as a 
robustness check on the relative contribution of growth and cost of capital effects in 
explaining the way value varies with CSP.  Furthermore, we extend the work of Gregory and 
Whittaker by examining the valuation of CSR strengths and weaknesses separately, and by 
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categorizing firms according to the “purity” of their commitment to CSR using the 
classification developed in Fernando et al. (2010). 
Both in our conceptualisation of CSR as based in stakeholder theory and in the specification 
of the theoretical framework and methodology we employ, there is an implicit assumption 
that CSR has a causal effect (which could be positive or negative) on financial performance. 
We note that there have been objections within the literature to assumptions that a positive 
correlation between CSR and CFP is a result of this causal relation.   For example Preston 
and O’Bannon (1997) and Waddock and Graves (1997) have suggested that causation could 
lie in the opposite direction, with the availability of slack (financial) resources determining 
the amount of spending on CSR. While this line of enquiry is open to further investigation 
(and indeed there have been recent attempts to examine this, for example, Garcia-Castro, et 
al. (2010)), we suggest that it has become less relevant as CSR has become more associated 
with strategies of stakeholder engagement (as opposed to discretionary philanthropy) and 
with evidence that it is the significant and perpetual levels of investment in stakeholder 
engagement that are associated with superior financial performance (Barnett and Salomon, 
2012; Choi and Wang, 2009; Godfrey et al., 2009; Kim and Statman, 2012; Wang and Choi, 
2013). Therefore, it seems less likely that short term financial slack can drive a long term 
CSR commitment. Furthermore, Kim and Statman (2012) and Gregory and Whittaker 
(forthcoming) show that changes in CSP lead to subsequent changes in value, and that firms 
appear to be acting in the best long run interests of the shareholders when changing the level 
of engagement with CSR.  Recent research by Flammer (2013) uses exogenous variation in 
CSR in the form of adoption of close-call shareholder proposals on CSR and finds that CSR-
related shareholder proposals leads to superior financial performance. This finding, under 
conditions where causality is certain, also lends support to our basic assumption that CSP is 
more likely to be the driver of valuation effects than the result of it. 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses  
Our theoretical starting point is the rational market valuation of the firm.  Fundamentally, the 
value of any firm is the present value of its future cash flows, discounted at the appropriate 
cost of capital, such that the value of the firm’s equity1 is given by: 
                                                             
1 Firms can be valued in various ways, for example, at the enterprise level (that is to say, the combined value of 
the firm’s debt and equity) or at the equity or shareholder level (which involves valuing firm level cash flows at 
the equity cost of capital), but properly calculated the results are always equivalent (Lundholm and O’Keefe, 
2001). In this paper, the equity level is the focus, purely because the models employed in this paper have 
originated at this level.    
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                                                                     Vt = ∑
Ct
(1 + re)τ
t=∞
t=1
                                                           (1) 
Where Ct is the expected cash flow in year t, and re, the rate of return required by the 
shareholders. Since investors and stock market analysts typically think, and forecast, in terms 
of expected future profits rather than cash flows, it is helpful to convert (1) into a valuation 
model based on expected profits,  xt, and accounting book values, bt, rather than expected 
cash flows (Peasnell, 1982; Ohlson, 1995; Lundholm and O’Keefe, 2001).  This model is 
based upon the economic notion of ‘normal’ profit rates, which would be the required return 
on the opening value of the assets, or re × bt−1  .  ‘Abnormal profits’, or ‘residual income’ 
will then be xt
a = xt − re × bt−1  
 
and the firm will be worth the present value of its future 
residual income plus its opening asset value.  So (1) can be restated as: 
                                                Vt = bt + ∑
xτ
a
(1 + re)τ
τ=∞
τ=t+1
                                                           (2)
 
Our objective is to examine the difference CSR makes to both cash flow expectations, and 
cost of capital expectations. This involves ascertaining how the cost of equity varies with 
risk, and establishing the distinction between firm-specific risk and systematic risk.  
 
Systematic, or market, risk is typically macro-economic in nature. Examples include 
economic growth rate shocks, interest rate shocks, oil price shocks and inflation shocks, all of 
which affect the majority of stocks, though some stocks are more exposed to this type of risk 
than others. Capital goods manufacturers, highly leveraged firms and financial stocks tend to 
be more exposed to adverse macro-economic conditions, while typically utilities and 
supermarkets have a relatively low exposure.  In contrast to systematic risk, firm-specific risk 
is particular to a firm. The relevance of the distinction between the two types of risk is that, 
since an investor can diversify away firm-specific risk, it is solely the systematic risk that is a 
determinant of the required rate of return, and thereby the cost of capital. Consider two recent 
disasters. The Deepwater Horizon accident involving BP was firm-specific, and a diversified 
investor would experience little financial loss, whilst the effect of the collapse of Lehman 
brothers was economy wide, resulting in unavoidable losses.2 This systematic risk could not 
be circumvented through diversification across companies.  
                                                             
2 The clean-up and compensation costs to BP of the Deepwater Horizon accident have been estimated at up to 
$37bn (Financial Times 26/2/12).  This cash flow effect resulting from firm-specific risk, however unpalatable it 
may seem, can be diversified away by shareholders.  For instance, at the worst point in the spill disaster, BP’s 
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In the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), commonly used in strategic management 
research (Ruefli et al.1999), the relationship between systematic risk and the cost of capital, 
re, is a function of the risk free rate, 𝑟𝑓 , the expected return on the market as a whole, rm, and 
the stock’s beta, βe. Beta captures the volatility of the stock in relation to the market and so 
indicates the degree of exposure to systematic risk.  
                                            re = rf +βe(rm − rf)                                                    (3) 
The CAPM assumes that there is only one systematic risk factor, the exposure to which is 
captured by the beta (βe). However, there is considerable debate regarding the most 
appropriate asset pricing model and alternative models to the basic CAPM in (3) have been 
suggested, such as conditional CAPMs, the Fama-French three factor (1993) model, the 
Carhart (1997) four factor model and Arbitrage Pricing Theory models. Significantly, all of 
these models share the same fundamental hypothesis that with diversified portfolios, only 
systematic risk affects expected returns.  From the point of view of the shareholders, re, is the 
required rate of return for a particular firm given its exposure to systematic risk factors. From 
the firm’s point of view, re is their cost of equity capital.  It follows that the higher the 
systematic risk exposure, the higher the expected return to compensate for the risk. 
None of this implies that markets are indifferent to firm-specific risk.  Instead, rather than 
being reflected in the expected cost of capital, firm-specific risks are rendered in expected 
future cash flows.   Consequently, the firm-specific risk of any CSR impacts will show up as 
positive or negative impacts in the expected cash flows, but will not influence the expected 
cost of equity capital.  Overall, it follows that firm value is enhanced by expectations of 
higher growth in cash flows, lower probability of cash flow shocks, and lower exposure to 
adverse macro-economic conditions resulting in low systematic risk. An example of a firm 
adopting policies that reduce its carbon footprint through improved energy efficiency 
provides a hypothetical case that illustrates all three possible effects on firm value.  More 
efficient use of energy not only reduces costs and so improves cash flow, but also gives the 
firm a lower exposure to energy prices.  Since energy prices impact upon the economy, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
shares roughly halved in value.  However, a well-diversified investor with just 1% of her portfolio in BP’s 
stocks would have suffered a loss of around 0.5% on such a portfolio.  Contrast this situation with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers.  On the single day that this event occurred, the US market as a whole fell by 4.71%.  
Therefore, even if the investor was perfectly diversified across the five hundred stocks that comprise the S&P 
500 index, in just one day she would have suffered a near 5% fall in her wealth.  Of course, international 
diversification helps, but all major markets fell when Lehman’s filed for bankruptcy.   
 
 
7 
 
might reasonably expect our low carbon firm to have a lower beta as a consequence of this 
strategy.  In addition, if this strategy finds favour with consumers of its products, it might 
also enjoy higher cash flows as the result of its policies.  These cash flow effects could show 
up either in the form of higher profitability immediately, or in the form of superior long run 
growth prospects as more consumers switch to the firm’s products.  The net effect will be that 
both numerator and denominator in (1) and (2) will change. Further, such a strategy might 
also diminish firm-specific risk by reducing the company’s vulnerability to the threat of any 
government introduction of carbon pricing to its industry.  Once again this would change the 
numerator as expected cash flows would be increased by the reduction in firm-specific risk.   
This insight is at the heart of our approach to examining the means by which CSR impacts 
upon firm value. 
While much has been written from the resource-based view and stakeholder perspectives on 
how CSR strategies might influence firm performance, we need to specifically make a 
distinction between the relevance of CSR for cash flows, particularly over a longer time 
period, and for the cost of capital.   The resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) 
implies that firms are rewarded with a higher stock price if they achieve and sustain a 
competitive advantage. To attain this, firms must have value creating resources that are rare, 
and difficult to replicate and substitute. Intangible resources, such as intellectual capital, 
organizational skills, corporate culture and reputation, are understood to be important in 
achieving a competitive advantage and CSR is considered to be influential in this respect 
(Branco and Rodrigues, 2006, Surroca et al. 2010).   Hart (1995) proposes the ‘natural-
resource-based view’ and identifies the potential for firms of gaining long term advantage 
through developing complex cross-functional teams to address environmental concerns. 
Russo and Fouts (1997) and Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003) elaborate on the intangible 
organizational skills acquired by going beyond legal compliance on environmental matters.  
Other literature focuses on CSR strategy employed through stakeholder engagement. For 
example, Jones (1995) suggests that there are benefits to firms from developing stakeholder 
trust through reduced transaction costs, and Hillman and Keim (2001) find evidence that 
transforming relationships with primary stakeholders from transactional to relational, could 
enhance competitive advantage.   
 
As previously noted, CSR strategies can also improve cash flows by mitigating firm-specific 
risk. For example, pollution prevention policies reduce the risk of fines or clean up costs, and 
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good employee relations can reduce the risk of labour disruption. Godfrey et al. (2009) have 
expanded the argument that CSR reduces firm-specific risk, by providing evidence that good 
relationships with stakeholders build goodwill, and thereby reduce the cash flow shock when 
a negative event transpires.  For instance, should an environmental accident or a product 
safety concern occur, the likelihood of consumer boycotts and other negative cash flow 
effects is lessened as a result of having moral capital. Choi and Wang (2009) argue that 
positive stakeholder relations not only help a company gain a competitive advantage, but 
sustain an advantage over the long term.  Their case is based on good stakeholder relations 
facilitating the development of new capabilities, thereby reducing the likelihood of core 
competences becoming core rigidities, and thus enabling a company to move out of 
disadvantageous business circumstances, and reduce firm-specific risk.  
 
From an instrumental standpoint, engaging in a CSR strategy is a form of investment, 
entailing initial costs for future financial benefits (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006).   It may be 
that the impact on the long run future cash flows is positive, but short run cash flows are 
adversely affected. Russo and Fouts (1997) draw attention to the short run financial risk of 
investing in pollution prevention technology in the expectation of long run rewards.  Barnett 
(2007) gives emphasis to the time required to build effective stakeholder relationships, 
arguing that only those firms with a real commitment to CSR activity are likely to realize the 
long term benefits of such investment. Consequently, only high levels of investment in CSR 
yield net benefits, with a lower degree of commitment failing to generate benefits greater 
than costs, resulting in a U-shaped relationship between CSR and financial performance. 
Barnett and Salomon (2012) provide evidence using accounting data (Return on Assets and 
Net Income) to support this hypothesis.  The implication for firm valuation is that although 
there may be a short term negative impact on profitability, if investors are able to infer which 
firms are making a serious commitment to a CSR agenda and value those firms accordingly, 
then such firms will be rewarded by higher valuations despite negative short term profits.   
This leads to our first two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1. CSR strengths add to value while CSR weaknesses detract from value. 
Hypothesis 2. Higher CSR firms will have higher near term profitability or higher medium 
to long term growth in earnings and residual income. 
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Studies considering the effect of CSR on firm risk have mainly concentrated on the reduction 
of firm-specific risk rather than on how CSR affects the firm’s exposure to systematic risk. 
Certainly the link between CSR strategies and firm-specific risk is more direct than the link 
between CSR strategies and systematic risk. McGuire et al. (1988, p.857) find weak evidence 
of a negative association between CSR and systematic risk, and state their position that ‘The 
impact of social responsibility on measures of a firm's systematic risk may, however, be 
minimal, since most events affecting a firm's level of social responsibility do not 
systematically affect all other firms in the marketplace’. Perrini et al. (2011) recently 
reviewed how CSP might impact on financial performance but although noting the risk 
mitigating effects of CSR, did not deconstruct them into firm-specific and systematic risk 
effects.  
Nevertheless, in recent years there has been greater interest in whether CSR might affect 
systematic risk and thereby the firm’s cost of capital.  Sharfman and Fernando (2008), 
focusing on environmental strategy, show for their sample that a firms beta is a declining 
function of its degree of environmental risk management, suggesting that firms that invest in 
this form of risk management enjoy a lower cost of capital. El Ghoul et al. (2011) adopt a 
different approach to determine the implied cost of capital, and follow Hong and Kacperczyk 
(2009) in applying the theoretical work of Heinkel et al. (2001) that proposes that firm-
specific risk might also be an influence on the cost of capital. Heinkel et al.’s argument is 
based on the conjecture that if a sufficient number of principled investors do not invest in 
polluting firms, the reduced investor base raises the cost of capital because the opportunities 
for diversifying risk are diminished. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) focus on firms in certain 
‘sin’ industries (alcohol, tobacco, and gaming) that are excluded from the portfolios of some 
principled investors. However, Hillman and Keim (2001) view the exclusion of such 
industries as ‘social issue participation’ issues, outside the normal domain of CSR, and it 
remains an empirically open question as to whether sufficient investors have been deterred 
from investing in particular firms with low CSR, as opposed to avoiding specific industries as 
in the case of Hong and Kacperczyk (2009).   
An alternative, and more general, approach to considering the theoretical possibility of CSR 
having an impact on the cost of capital is offered by acknowledging that an individual stock's 
beta is partly determined by the total risk of a stock's return. Therefore it is shaped by factors 
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that also influence firm-specific risk (Peavy, 1984).3  Lubatakin and Chatterjee (1994, p. 113) 
have argued that ‘some factors that have traditionally been ascribed to one component of 
corporate stock return risk also influence the other components’. They employ an example of 
a firm installing a new technology, which establishes a market entry barrier that will ensure 
regular cash flows.  Although this is a firm-specific risk reducing effect, it could reduce 
systematic risk as well by putting the firm in a more powerful position to determine output 
and input prices during macro-economic disturbances.  In line with this, Albuquerque et al. 
(2012) (following the work of Luo and Bhattacharya, 2009), suggest that good customer 
relations can reduce the elasticity of demand, therefore making sales more durable in an 
economic downturn. They find that CSR brought a significant reduction in a firm’s beta. The 
work of Choi & Wang (2009), that good stakeholder relations improve a company’s 
resilience, is also likely to have relevance in adverse macro-economic circumstances.  
Oikonomou et al. (2012) find that corporate social responsibility is negatively but weakly 
related to systematic risk, but that corporate social irresponsibility is positively and strongly 
related to systematic risk.  With growing interest in the relevance of CSR for reducing a 
firm’s cost of capital, it becomes appropriate to consider how relevant it is to determining 
value. We explore this with our final hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Higher CSR firms will have lower systematic risk exposures.  
 
Data and Methodology  
Our measures of CSP are from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) database and 
covers the period 1992-2009.  The KLD database provides an assessment of firms according 
to environmental, social and corporate governance criteria.4  The data starts from 1991 with a 
coverage of 650 firms, composed largely of S&P 500 firms. By 2001, the coverage extended 
to 1100 firms by including firms in the Russell 1000 index. Beginning in 2003, the sample 
extends to 3100 firms including firms included in the Russell 3000 index. Our initial sample 
therefore consists of U.S. firms for which CSR data is available from the KLD database. 
Essentially, the KLD data takes the form of a series of zero-one variables for a number of 
                                                             
3 Precisely, beta is the firm’s standard deviation of the firm’s return multiplied by the market’s standard 
deviation of return multiplied by the correlation between the firm’s and the market’s return, divided by the 
market variance of returns (i.e. the firm’s covariance of return with the market return, divided by the market 
variance). 
4 This database is well-known in the CSR literature and more detailed descriptions of KLD database can be 
found in Hillman and Keim (2001), Mattingly and Berman (2006), Bird et al. (2007) and Barnett and Salomon 
(2012).   
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strengths and concerns across the following CSR indicators: Community; Governance; 
Diversity; Employees; Environment; Human Rights and Product. The number of strengths 
and concerns differ between indicators, are not symmetrical, and can change over time as 
new concerns emerge or fail to be important.  For instance, in the Environment indicator, 
climate change first appeared as a concern in 1999. In our analysis we omit the governance 
and human rights indicators. The Human Rights indicator is omitted partly due to missing 
observations in the early years and partly due to how involvement with certain countries that 
would have been seen as a concern has changed over time (see Gregory and Whittaker, 
forthcoming). The Governance indicator is omitted partly as it differs from those usually used 
in the governance literature (Kempf and Osthoff, 2007) and partly due to  the fact that the 
Governance dimension includes high levels of executive pay as a concern, and low levels as a 
strength, which is problematic if executive pay includes performance related elements 
(Gregory and Whittaker, forthcoming). Appendix A describes the strengths and concerns of 
each dimension that we consider. One feature of the KLD data is that the mean number of 
strengths and concerns is low, at less than one in all cases, suggesting that a large number of 
firms have neither strengths nor weaknesses. Consequently we employ an alternative 
classification of CSR suggested in Fernando et al. (2010). Their paper simplifies the KLD 
rankings on environment by categorizing firms into four groups: ‘Green’ firms, which have 
only strengths; ‘Toxic’ firms which have only concerns; ‘Grey’ firms which have some 
strengths and some concerns; and ‘Neutral’ firms which have neither strengths nor concerns.  
We adopt this classification for all categories of CSR, and retain the Fernando et al.(2010) 
labels for clarity and convenience.  Our reason for doing this is as follows. Although in 
principle we would expect the number of strengths and concerns to contain more information 
than dummy variables, such as ‘Green’ or `Toxic’ firms, one potential disadvantage of using 
the number is that it assumes a linear relationship between the strength or concern count and 
their value.  If, for example, market values are driven down by a number of socially 
responsible investors exiting the market for stocks with any weaknesses in a certain CSR 
category, then it is perfectly possible that the relationship between value and number of 
strengths or concerns is non-linear.  Furthermore, some firms have both strengths and 
weaknesses for given indicators, and so one might argue that the Fernando et al. (2010) 
categorization is a cleaner one.  However, for completeness,  in addition to  using ‘Green’ 
and ‘Toxic’ dummy variables in our tests for valuation, forecasted profitability, and the 
estimation of implied cost of equity capital and growth rates described below, we also show 
the results based on the number of strengths and weaknesses.  
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Our tests for systematic risk differences, which rely on realised returns, require a portfolio 
formation rule.  The distributional properties of individual KLD indicators are such that it is 
not possible to form ‘clean’ portfolios based upon quantiles, so the only unambiguous 
portfolio formation rule is either to employ the Fernando et al. (2010) definition, or to form a 
classification based upon whether net scores are positive, negative or zero.  The former has 
the advantage of giving clean classifications in cases where firms have both strengths and 
concerns, so we prefer it here.5  Note that this categorisation gives conservative groupings for 
the ‘overall’ CSR indicator, where firms are required to have strengths in at least one 
dimension and weaknesses in no dimension to be classified as ‘Green’ (and vice-versa for 
‘Toxic’).   
 
To test our hypotheses, we also require data on share prices and returns, accounting data and 
analysts’ forecast data. The source of share price and returns data is CRSP.  Following Fama 
and French (1993), accounting data (and KLD data) as of December of year t are matched 
with share prices in June of year t+1. If markets are efficient, this should ensure that all 
financial information for the financial year ended in year t, and any information in KLD 
indicators for year t, have been embedded in share prices. The source for all accounting data 
is COMPUSTAT, from which we collect the following pieces of accounting information 
required for our analysis. These are: Book Value per share (BVPS); Net Income per share 
(NIPS); Long-Term Debt and Total Assets from which we construct a measure of Leverage 
as the ratio of Long-Term debt to total Assets (LTDTA), Sales and; R&D spending per share 
(RDPS).  The source for the investment analysts’ earnings forecast data is the Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES), from which we obtain the consensus 
(mean) analysts forecasts of earnings and forecasted growth rates.  To avoid problems with 
forecasts being possibly contaminated with interim information for firms with differing 
financial year ends, we eliminate from our sample all firms that do not have a December 
financial year end.6  For our tests that do not require analysts’ forecast data, the KLD data is 
then cross matched with CRSP and COMPUSTAT, which results in a sample of 16,758 firm-
year observations. Where we use IBES data, the sample size reduces to 13,089.  Finally, 
where R&D expenditure is missing, we set the value to zero.7 
                                                             
5 If a firm has both strengths and concerns, it is unambiguously ‘Gray’ using the Fernando et al (2010) 
categorisation.  By contrast, the net score could be positive, negative or zero in such circumstances. 
6 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this potential difficulty. 
7 Note that for our sample of US firms, while the reporting of the expense is mandatory, there is always the 
materiality consideration.  An entity may choose not to report such an amount if it is viewed as non-material.  
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Research Method 
Analysis of the impact of CSR on firm value 
The valuation model we employ is based on the framework developed by Peasnell (1982) and 
Ohlson (1995) described in (2) above.  The specification in (2) shows that the current price is 
the sum of a discounted abnormal earnings stream and current book value.  Ohlson (1995) 
and Rees (1997) show that under certain assumptions about constant long run growth rates in 
abnormal earnings, the specification in (2) can be rewritten as a weighted sum of book values 
and current earnings. In addition, Ohlson (1995) introduces the notion of an “other 
information parameter”, which reflects information that is not captured in current earnings or 
book values but nevertheless affects the market value. This type of approach gives the 
theoretical underpinning for the class of models estimated in the accounting literature to 
determine whether additional information influences stock prices (e.g. Barth, Beaver and 
Landsman, 1992).   The general form of these models can be summarized (suppressing firm 
subscripts for clarity) as: 
 Pt =β0 +β1bt +β2xt +β3ϑt +εt                                                    (4) 
Where, as before 𝑏𝑡, 𝑥𝑡 are book value and profit and 𝜗𝑡 is some form of ‘other information’.  
Here, ‘other information’ will include our measures of CSR.  In other words, we are testing 
whether the β3 coefficients in (4) that capture the effects of our CSR indicators are significant 
in explaining firm valuation.   
 
Certainly there are other approaches to addressing the question of whether markets value 
CSR strategies.  One approach would be using Tobin’s Q (which is typically proxied by 
calculating the firm’s market value to book asset value ratio)  to  compare the Q-ratios of 
high and low CSR firms, and this is the approach taken in Guenster et al. (2011). However, 
this measure has several shortcomings. First, it is relatively atheoretic (Gregory and 
Whittaker, forthcoming). Second, it cannot readily incorporate the effects of intangibles 
which appear relevant in explaining CSR effects (McWilliams and Siegel, 2000; Surroca et 
al., 2010). Third, any differences in Q-ratios between firms are simply assumed to be 
attributable to CSR, yet they could easily be a consequence of differences in business models 
or to firm-specific accounting choices (which would affect the book values). 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
So our view is that it is entirely reasonable to assume R&D expenditures are approximately zero when they are 
not disclosed. Unreported robustness checks on firms that only have reported values confirms that this does not 
seem to qualitatively affect the results, save for the sample size being considerably smaller. 
14 
 
McWilliams and Siegel (2000) establish the case for the effect of intangibles by including 
expenditure on R&D and advertising, as control variables when estimating the financial 
performance of CSR. We include R&D expenditure (see above and footnote 6), but for our 
sample of US firms and for the duration of study the disclosure of advertising expenditure 
was effectively voluntary within certain limits (Simpson, 2008) and therefore zero amounts 
are likely to reflect strategic reporting decisions by firms. Given the fact that advertising 
expenditure data are not reliably available, we do not include advertising as a control.  In 
relation to intangibles, note however, that we are silent on the Surocca et al. (2010) 
hypothesis and do not attempt to model any feedback loop between CSR and intangibles.  We 
simply attempt to investigate whether CSR adds anything to firm value once the impact of 
our proxy for expenditure on intangibles has been controlled for.  
 
Our specific valuation model is based upon the Barth et al. (1992) and Barth et al. (1998) 
implementations of the model described in (4) above. We run a regression of share price on 
book value per share (BVPS), net income (or earnings) per share (NIPS), control variables for 
SIZE (log of total assets [LOGAss] or  log of sales [LOGSal) and leverage (LTDTA – which 
is computed as the ratio of long term debt to total assets) plus a vector of “other information” 
variables.  These “other information” variables are: a proxy for intangible assets, RDPSit, 
which is the R&D expenditure per share for firm i in year t and a set of CSR measures 
derived from KLD data. The regressions are run for each CSR indicator individually and for 
all CSR indicators in combination. In our valuation tests, we run two specifications of the 
regression model. In the first specification the Strit and Conit  are simply the number of 
strengths and concerns respectively, for each indicator.  When running the regressions over 
all the CSR indicators together, we use an overall measure of strength (OverStr) and an 
overall measure of concern (OverCon).  OverStr is simply the sum of the number of strengths 
and OverCon is the sum of the number of concerns across all the CSR indicators, 
respectively. Formally, our model is: 
Pit= ∑β0jINDjit+
j=10
j=1
β1BVPSit+β2NIPSit+β3LTDTAit+β4SIZEit+β5RDPSit+β6Strit+β7Conit+ε8it    (5)  
 
Where Strit and Conit are KLD strength and concern indicators respectively for firm i in year t.  
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Our alternative specification employs dummy variables for KLD strength and concern 
indicators defined using the Fernando et al. (2010) classification, as opposed to the numbers 
of strengths and concerns. For each CSR indicator firms are classified as `Green’ if they only 
have strengths and `Toxic’ if they only have weaknesses, so that the model becomes: 
 
Pit= ∑ β0jINDjit+
j=10
j=1 β1BVPSit+β2NIPSit+β3LTDTAit+β4SIZEit+β5RDPSit+β6Greenit+β7Toxicit+ε8it   
(6) 
 
To allow for industry effects, our regression model is estimated with industry dummy 
variables (defined using Fama-French 48 industry groups).8 All our regression tests are 
conducted using the two-way cluster robust standard error (or CL-2) approach of Petersen 
(2009), which Gow et al. (2010) show to yield well-specified standard errors in accounting 
panel data simulations.  Using CL-2 yields well-specified standard errors when fixed effects 
models do not.  As Petersen (2009) points out, choosing the correct approach depends upon 
the likely form of dependence in the data.  If CSR scores are likely to be ‘sticky’ for a firm 
across time, then the research design needs to be robust to both time and firm effects, and so 
our standard errors are clustered on firm and year.  
 
Analysis of the impact of CSR on short term profitability, earnings growth and the cost of 
capital. 
 
Our analysis of the impact of CSR on firm value amounts to a test of whether the coefficients 
on Strengths and Concerns (or dummy variables for ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’) in (5) are 
significant.  Having investigated the valuation effects of CSR, the analysis is developed to 
consider where any impact of CSR on valuation comes from.  Equation (2) reveals that it can 
come from three sources: short term earnings, longer term earnings-which depend on the 
growth rate, and the cost of capital.  
 
We start with an analysis of realised returns, and we investigate the cost of capital differences 
between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms by forming portfolios of these stocks and estimating the 
Fama-French three factor (1996) model in (7) below. The three factor model in (7) extends 
the CAPM in (3) and provides a richer way to model exposure to systematic risk. The model 
                                                             
8 From Ken French’s data library: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
Results are robust to an alternative 10-industry classification. 
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considers two additional factors9: a size factor (SMB) and a value factor (HML) which proxy 
for systematic risk factors not fully captured by the simple specification of the CAPM and the 
coefficients on these factors represent exposure to systematic risk factors beyond the market 
index beta.10 
 
Rpt − Rft = αp + βp(Rmt − Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + εpt                          (7) 
 
As in Edmans (2011), the model is also run on an industry adjusted basis, by forming an 
industry matched control portfolio (Rpjt), where each firm in the CSR portfolio is matched 
with its Fama-French 48 industry return.11  We then run the regression: 
 
Rpt − Rpjt =αp +βp(Rmt − Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt +εpt                          (8) 
 
The regression in (8) should control for any industry effects not picked up by the factor 
loadings.  Given the company level analysis in our valuation regressions, regressions (7) and 
(8) are estimated using equally weighted portfolios and robust standard errors.12     
 
For our analysis of profitability and growth rates, our approach is designed to makes full use 
of the information available in analysts’ forecasts by employing the Lee et al. (1999) version 
of the Ohlson/Peasnell (OP) model,13 which can be written as: 
 
 Pt = bt + ∑
(FROEt+τ − re)
(1 + re)
bt+τ−1 +
(FROEn − re)bn−1(1 + g)
(re − g)(1 + re)n
n
τ=1
                              (9) 
 
Where g is the long run growth rate from year n onwards, FROEt+τ  is the forecasted return 
on equity for period t + τ, computed as forecast EPS for period t + τ / book value of equity for 
                                                             
9 The additional factors are motivated by the observation that average returns on stocks of small stocks and on 
stocks with a high book to market ratio (value stocks) have been historically higher and as such may represent 
proxies for exposures to sources of systematic risk not captures by CAPM. 
10 Note that results are robust to the use of the alternative Carhart (1997) four-factor model, which uses an 
additional momentum factor in addition to the three systematic risk factors in the three factor model.  However, 
as our context is corporate cost of capital, we prefer the three factor model given the ambiguity on whether 
momentum is a rationally priced risk factor or an anomaly. 
11 All industry returns are from Ken French’s data library. 
12 Value-weighted results are available from the authors on request. 
13 Strictly, although Lee et al. (1999) claim that their model is based on Ohlson (1995) it is actually a version of 
the Peasnell (1982) model, as there is neither an “other information” parameter, nor a “linear information 
dynamic” in the model estimated. 
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period t + τ - 1.   As in (2), the above is a valuation expression for the firm in terms of its 
‘residual income’ or ‘abnormal earnings’.  The key difference between this model and the 
version of the model described by (2) is that in (9) a form of constant growth is assumed 
beyond year n, with specific forecasts of income being allowed for years t to n.  This has the 
advantage of allowing us to use analysts’ earnings forecasts for years t to n, and then solve 
the expression for the long run growth rate, g, implied by the share price, Pt .  Of course, we 
could solve (9) for the implied cost of equity capital (ICEC), re, implied by Pt but to do so 
requires an assumption that long run growth is consistent between all firms in an industry, 
irrespective of their level of CSR.14  
 
The Barth et al. (1998) approach in (5) and (6) and the Lee et al. (1999) approach in (9) are 
complementary for several reasons. First, from a conceptual point of view, the Lee et al. 
(1999) model can only be solved for either ICEC, or growth, but not both simultaneously.  
Given that, a priori, we might expect both a cost of capital effect and a cash flow effect from 
CSR, the Barth et al. (1998) model allows us to avoid ascribing valuation effects to either 
ICEC or growth in the first instance.  Second, the growth effects in the above model are 
potentially complex, as short term growth in residual income can differ from long run growth.  
In this respect, the Lee et al. (1999) model is useful, as it allows us to embed the full 
information in analysts’ forecasts.  IBES provides a consensus analysts’ forecast for 2-3 years 
ahead. However, we note that the coverage is more extensive when we consider the first two 
years of analyst’s forecasts and therefore in our analysis below, we restrict the model to two 
periods i.e. n=2 in (9) above. Using the model in (9), embedding the analysts’ consensus 
forecasts enables us to provide the following analyses.  
 
First, we analyse differences in short term profitability (based on  forecast ROE) by 
considering the one year ahead and two year ahead forecasted ROE directly from analysts’ 
forecasts of earnings up to two years ahead.  We operationalise this by a regression of 
forecasted ROE on either the log of total assets (our proxy for size) or alternatively the log of 
sales (an alternative proxy for size), leverage, current R&D expenditure, and a dummy 
variable for the Fama-French 48 industry membership.  All regression tests are estimated 
with Petersen (2009) cluster robust standard errors, and test for differences between CSR 
groupings are made using an F-test. For this analysis, we consider both the Fernando et al. 
                                                             
14 This is one of the approaches taken in El Ghoul et al. (2011), who find that for two CSR indicators 
(environment and employee relations) high CSR firms have a lower implied equity cost of capital.  
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(2010), ‘Green’, ‘Toxic’, ‘Grey’ and ‘Neutral’ classifications (with ‘Neutral’ being the base 
category) as well as  based  number of CSR strengths and concerns.  
 
Second, we test for differences in long run implied growth between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ 
firms using the model in (9) by each CSR category, holding re constant on an industry-wide 
basis. Note that, since we restrict n=2, the growth rates represent the growth rate in residual 
earnings from the end of year 2 to infinity.  As we shall show below, whilst ‘Green’ firms 
appear to have lower risk exposures than ‘Toxic’ firms, most of these differences appear to be 
attributable to industry effects. Accordingly, we estimate an industry-specific cost of capital 
for each of the Fama-French 48 industry groups.  To do so we use the ten year Treasury Bond 
rate each year, and given the evidence in Claus and Thomas (2001), set the market risk 
premium at 3.4 percent (although we sensitise our results using alternative estimates of three 
percent, four percent and five percent, this broad range being consistent with Dimson et al. 
(2011)).  We then calculate rolling industry betas each year using the previous 60 months of 
returns, by employing the industry portfolio and market factor returns from Ken French’s 
website.  These betas are employed in a simple CAPM framework to give time-varying 
industry cost of capital.  The industry specific cost of capital is then calculated as the ten year 
US Treasury Bond rate + (industry beta x the market risk premium).  Note that, in these 
estimations, we do not employ the Fama-French (1993) or the Carhart (1997) model when 
estimating an industry cost of capital given the difficulty of calculating a rational expected 
risk premium for the SMB, HML and MOM factors.15As in the case of the analysis of short 
term profitability, we operationalise the analysis by a regression of the growth rates (implied 
by the analyst’s forecasts of earnings, current prices and calculated industry cost of capital 
estimates) on log of total assets (our proxy for size) or log of sales (our alternative proxy for 
size), leverage, current R&D expenditure, and a dummy variable for the Fama-French 48 
industry membership.  Again, all regression tests are estimated with Petersen (2009) cluster 
robust standard errors, and tests for differences between CSR groupings are made using an F-
test. For this analysis, we again consider both the Fernando et al. (2010), ‘Green’, ‘Toxic’, 
‘Grey’ and ‘Neutral’ classifications (with ‘Neutral’ being the base category) and also employ 
the  number of CSR strengths and concerns.  
 
                                                             
15 Given this, we also re-ran our tests using an assumption that all industries have a true beta of unity, i.e. we 
assume that in any given year, all firms face the same cost of capital.  The results were qualitatively identical. 
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Finally, we note that one limitation is that in (9) above, we can either assume the firm-
specific cost of capital is known, or that the rate of terminal growth is known.  We have set 
out the argument for why we believe the known cost of capital assumption is more 
reasonable.  However, there is an alternative approach that exists in the accounting literature, 
developed in Easton et al. (2002), that simultaneously estimates the implied cost of equity 
and growth rate in stock prices.  Simultaneous estimation is based on the logic that 
assumption of any implied expected rate of return will invariably affect the estimates of the 
growth rate and vice-versa. However, simultaneous estimation comes at a cost, in that it is 
impossible to estimate these two parameters at individual stock level, and they can only be 
solved for at portfolio level.  The model is developed in detail in Easton et al. (2002, pp 660-
663), but its implementation is described by the regression in expression (8) in their paper, 
which is: 
 
XjCT bj0⁄ =γ0 +γ1[Pj0 bj0⁄ ] + ej0                                                       (10) 
 
Where: 
XjCT is the aggregate n-forecast period cum-dividend earnings
16 
γ0 = G − 1 = (1 + g
′)n = 1 +the expected rate of growth in the n-forecast period residual 
income 
γ1 = R − 1 = (1 + re)
n= 1+ the n-forecast period expected return on equity. 
 
As Easton et al. (2002) and Easton and Sommers (2007) show, we can solve for R and G by 
estimating the regression implied by (10). This model is generalisable to any period for which 
forecasts are available, but as we have full forecasts for two years ahead, with sometimes 
more generalised earnings growth estimates beyond year 2, in this paper we set n = 2 to make 
full use of those forecasts.  We note, though, that Easton and Somers use forecasts just one 
period ahead and we estimate the model on this basis as a robustness check.  Note that in this 
model ‘G’ is defined as the expected average annual growth rate in residual income from the 
date at which earnings forecasts are made, which differs from the definition of ‘g’ in equation 
(9), which refers to the expected growth in residual income from the final year for which the 
forecast is available.  
 
                                                             
16 Defined as in equation (4) from Easton et al (2002). 
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In order to conduct this analysis, we run the regression model in (10) for portfolios sorted on 
year, Fama-French 10 industry group, and portfolios formed on the basis of their CSR 
classification.  We choose a 10-industry grouping here, rather than 48-industry groupings, in 
order to have a reasonable number of firms in each industry-year-class group.  We provide 
simple t-tests for differences between these growth and ICEC estimates (i.e. without any 
controls). We also report the results of the analysis where we control for size, R&D and 
leverage effects by running  regressions of the simultaneously derived implied growth rates, 
the implied costs of equity capital, and the implied differences between ‘R’ and ‘G’ on SIZE 
(either our log assets or log sales measure), leverage, current R&D expenditure and CSR 
dummies based on Fernando et al. (2010) ‘Green’, ‘Toxic’, ‘Grey’ and ‘Neutral’ 
classifications (with `Neutral’ being the base category).  
 
Results 
A summary of the KLD indicators of CSR and the correlations between strengths and 
weaknesses across the various dimensions of CSR is given in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The general pattern that emerges from the analysis of the correlations is that strengths are 
correlated across CSR categories, as are concerns. This suggests that firms adopt coherent 
CSR policies across different dimensions, and justifies the inclusion of a compound measure 
of CSR.  However, whilst strengths and concerns are generally not correlated, there is a 
correlation of 0.35 between Environmental strengths and concerns.  The Fernando et al. 
(2010) definition of ‘Grey’ firms, as opposed to ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms is useful for 
dealing with any issues caused by this type of correlation.  Most of the relationships between 
R&D and strengths are significantly positive.  Concerns show lower levels of correlation 
apart from Environment concerns. Taken as a whole, these relationships, most particularly 
with R&D, are consistent with the Surocca et al. (2010) evidence on CSR being mediated 
through intangibles.  However, the relatively small correlations might also imply that there 
are important aspects of CSR which are uncorrelated with these intangible assets. 
 
Analysis of the association between CSR and firm value 
Our first set of valuation results, reported in Table 2, show how market prices capture the 
individual effects of CSR strengths and concerns as specified by equations (5) and (6).  We 
show the regression results for each dimension of CSR. For each regression we report the 
coefficients and t-statistics for each of Book Value (BVPS), Net Income (NIPS), Leverage 
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(LTDTA), Size (LOGass), R&D expenditure (RDPS), and the individual CSR indicator 
strengths and concerns.  Notably, in all cases book value, net income, LOGass and R&D 
expenditures always show a significant positive relationship with value. Leverage on the 
other hand shows a negative relationship with value. The coefficients on RDPS indicate that 
markets treat such expenditure as creating an asset with a life well beyond the current period.  
Note that the reported regressions show the result of using the log of total assets as the size 
control.  Results using the log of sales are not reported for space reasons, but are qualitatively 
similar, although using the log of assets moderately improves the R-squareds of the 
regressions. 
Insert Table 2 here 
With the individual CSR strengths and concerns, a priori we might expect weaknesses to 
detract from value by causing either reputational damage, and/or because they indicate poor 
management. Conversely, positive investment in CSR activities might be expected to 
enhance value. However, if agency problems exist, there is a possibility that managers may 
over-invest in CSR, so that the costs of the CSR programme outweigh the likely benefits.  If 
this occurs, strengths may detract from, rather than add to, firm value. The first point to note 
from the regressions in Table 2 is that markets appear to view strengths and weaknesses 
differently. For Employee, they appear to value strengths significantly positively and 
concerns significantly negatively. For Community, Diversity and Environment concerns are 
negatively valued and significantly so.  Strengths on the other hand although postive are not 
significant.  For Product however, strengths are positively valued and significant, but 
concerns are not significantly negative. Overall, we note that for all indicators the sign on the 
coefficient on strengths is positive and that on concerns is negative, even in cases where these 
are not significant. Finally, across all the indicators together, strengths (OverStr) are 
significantly positive and concerns (OverCon) are significantly negative. 
 
The coefficients can be interpreted as the average $ amount the market adds to, or deducts 
from, the average share price for each strength or concern indicator.  In interpreting these 
coefficients it is important to realise that that there is considerable divergence between the 
number of strengths and concerns for each indicator (see Table 1). For example, Diversity has 
a maximum of seven strengths whilst Product has only three.  Environment has the maximum 
number of potential concerns at six, whilst Diversity has a maximum of two. This means that 
we cannot simply compare coefficients across strengths and weaknesses between indicators, 
or even within indicators, to gain any sense of the relative importance of such indicators 
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without being aware of relative scales. For example, a firm that scores the maximum of two 
concerns on Diversity would be expected to suffer a fall of (2 x $1.362) in its share price, 
whereas a firm scoring the maximum of six Environment concerns would show a decrease of 
(6 x $1.557).  
 
In Table 3 we report the results based on the specification in (6) using the Fernando et al. 
(2010) classification for each CSR indicator.   
Insert Table 3 here 
What we see emerge clearly from these regressions is the confirmation of all the Table 2 
results with respect to strengths, in that ‘Green’ firms (i.e. those with only strengths) are more 
highly valued, whilst ‘Toxic’ firms (those with only concerns) have lower values. ‘Green’ 
firms are valued positively and significantly so for Diversity, Employee and Product. 
Results with respect to concerns show that for all categories except Diversity and Product, 
the concerns are negative and significant, this is also consistent with the results we obtain in 
table 2. We also explore the effect of combined indicators, using our overall measure of 
‘greenness’ and ‘toxicity’.  Recall that the way this overall variable is set up requires a firm to 
have at least one strength and no concerns in any dimension to be classified as ‘Green’, or 
conversely at least one concern and no strengths in any dimension to be classified as ‘Toxic’, 
so that firms classified by this overall indicator are either unambiguously ‘good’ or 
unambiguously ‘bad’ in CSR terms.  This is different from the Overall indicator in Table 2 
which uses the simple sums of strengths and weaknesses. The result from table 3 shows (and 
confirms the result from table 2) that the overall package of concerns has a significantly 
negative impact on firm value and the overall package of strengths has a significant positive 
impact on value.  
 
 
Analysis of short term profitability, earnings growth and the cost of capital. 
Having shown that markets appear to value various dimensions of CSR, we now turn to an 
analysis of whether those effects are driven by differences in growth and profitability 
prospects, or by differences in the cost of capital.  As cost of capital is central to both the 
interpretation of profitability differences and any calculation of the implied long run growth, 
we start with an analysis of realised returns using the models in (7) and (8).  In Table 4 Panel 
A we report the results of a portfolio formed on the basis of a ‘Green’ classification.  In Panel 
B, we report the results of a portfolio formed on the basis of a ‘Toxic’ classification.  In Panel 
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C we report the results of a portfolio that is long in green stocks and short in toxic stocks.  
These are formed for each dimension individually, so that for any indicator the ‘Green’ 
portfolio includes all stocks classified as ‘Green’, with the ‘Toxic’ portfolio including all 
stocks classified as ‘Toxic’ for that dimension,  For the ‘Overall’ dimension a ‘Green’ 
(‘Toxic’) stock must be ‘Green’ (‘Toxic’) across every dimension to be included.  Due to 
space constraints we simply report the differences between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ stocks, when 
we consider the industry adjusted model (Panel D). 
Insert Table 4 here 
The risk exposures to the systematic risk factors are captured by the loading (the coefficients) 
on the market factor (rm-rf), size factor (smb) and a value/growth factor (hml). Overall, we 
note that Panels A and B show that the Fama-French three-factor model appears to do a 
reasonable job of explaining the portfolio returns, that there is some evidence of size effects 
being important, and that all the portfolios have some exposure to the HML factor. In terms 
of differences in risk exposures, reported in Panel C, an F-test indicates that all regressions 
except for those based on Community are statistically significant, and show that ‘Green’ firms 
have lower market beta (i.e. the coefficient on rm-rf) compared to ‘Toxic’ firms across all the 
dimensions (except Product). This is consistent with the evidence in Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008), although we note that the difference on the Overall indicator is not significant.  
Exposure to the SMB factor is mixed, with the Overall difference being insignificant, the 
Diversity difference being negative and the Environment and Product differences being 
significantly positive.  For each of Community, Employee, Environment and Product, 
together with the Overall indicator, `Green’ firms have a significantly lower exposure to the 
HML factor, although we again note the lack of significance of the Community regression.  In 
theory, book to market ratios capture growth prospects so that this lower exposure to HML is 
consistent with high CSR stocks being less exposed to low growth areas of the economy.  For 
example, technology stocks in general tend to have low HML exposures whereas heavy 
industry stocks tend to have high exposures. 
 
However, many of these differences lose their significance when estimated on an industry 
adjusted basis, suggesting that some of these risk differences are attributable to industry 
effects. On an industry-adjusted basis, reported in Panel D, only Community and Environment 
exhibit a significantly lower market beta for ‘Green’ firms compared to ‘Toxic’ firms. Here, 
all of the regressions are statistically significant, and show that the SMB exposure difference 
is significantly negative for Community, Diversity and Employee (at 10% significance only). 
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Only product has a significantly higher exposure to SMB. All the HML risk exposures 
differences between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms are insignificant except for Product where 
‘Toxic’ firms have higher exposures.  
 
Net of industry effects, overall the implied cost of capital differences are small.  If we take 
the Claus and Thomas (2001) estimate of the expected market risk premium (3.4 percent p.a.) 
and the long run (1927-2009) historical mean annualized estimates of SMB and HML (3.6% 
and 5.00%) from Ken French’s website, net of industry effects the cost of capital difference 
between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms using the significant coefficients from Table 4 would be 
only 0.63% in the case of Diversity, and less for all other categories.  For the Overall  
category, the implied difference in cost of equity equates to only 0.19% p.a. based upon these 
historical averages.  However, we note that Fama and French (2011) provide evidence that 
the “price” of SMB risk has not been significantly different from zero in the period since 
1990, implying that the cost of equity difference for the Overall category may simply be zero. 
So taking these figures in conjunction with the results in Tables 2 and 3, it seems likely that 
the cost of capital impact of CSR is likely to be dominated by the expected future profit 
element.17   
 
Next we examine the expected one year ahead profitability (Table5) and two year ahead 
profitability (Table 6) based on the analysts’ consensus forecasts  of earnings, and then derive 
the long run growth (Table 7) implied by these forecasts.  In all of this analysis, consistent 
with Table 2 and Table 3, we consider both the Fernando et al. (2010), ‘Green’, ‘Toxic’, 
‘Grey’ and ‘Neutral’ classifications (with ‘Neutral’ being the base category) 18 in Panel A of 
each Table, and the number of CSR strengths and concerns in Panel B of each Table.  Within 
each Panel, we first report the results from a regression of the forecast profitability (or 
implied long run growth) on the CSR indicator, dummy variables for Fama-French 48 
industry membership, size, leverage and R&D.  Our main results report the results where the 
log of assets is used as the size control.  In addition to reporting the regression tests, we report 
the results from an F-test (together with the associated p-value) for the difference between the 
‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ dummies.  We also report this test for difference between ‘Green’ and 
                                                             
17 We also note a small but marginally significant alpha for the Overall indicator for the industry-adjusted 
portfolio returns, suggesting that a portfolio long in ‘Green’ stocks and short in ‘Toxic’ stocks outperforms by 
about 0.141% per month on an industry-adjusted basis, although such an effect is statistically insignificant if the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model is employed. 
18 In unreported robustness checks, we obtain similar results using an alternative ‘positive’, ‘negative’ and ‘zero’ 
net score classification. 
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‘Toxic’ dummies using all the variables except that we use Sales as control for size (instead 
of total assets), which is shown in the Tables as (‘Green-Toxic’(S)), and a t-test for 
differences between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ without any controls (‘Green-Toxic’(NC)).  We 
start the examination of the expected future profitability using one year ahead forecasted 
profitability  
Insert Table 5 here 
For one year ahead ROE based on the Fernando et al. (2010) classification, with Total Assets 
as control for size,  ‘Green’ firms with respect to the Diversity and Employee categories are 
significantly more profitable than ‘Toxic’ firms, whilst high CSR firms with respect to 
Environment and Product categories are less profitable, with environment being significantly 
so. For the Overall indicator, profitability is lower for green firms but significant only at 10% 
level.  However, the results are not robust to use of alternative control for size. When we use 
sales as a size control these differences disappear. When we consider the number of CSR 
strengths and concerns (Panel B), the results suggest that for all categories (including 
Overall) except Environment, strengths have a positive impact on forecasted profitability. For 
Community, Product and Overall concerns a positive impact on profitability is also found. 
The overall conclusion that one can draw from Table 5 is that there does not appear to be any 
consistent and robust evidence for any superior positive impact of high CSR (measured using 
dummies or numbers) on one year ahead profitability. 
 
Broadly, these effects carry through to the forecasted two year ROE. With total assets as 
control for size, it appears that the high-scoring firms on Diversity are significantly more 
profitable, whilst high-scoring firms on Environment are significantly less profitable. The 
Overall indicator reveals no difference in profitability between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms.     
Insert Table 6 here 
 As in Table 5, these effects are not robust to alternative definitions of firm size. Using sales 
as a control for size all of the differences except for Environment disappears. When we 
consider the number of strengths and concerns, both strengths and concerns have a positive 
impact on two year ahead forecasted profitability, with concerns showing significant positive 
impact in all categories but Diversity, although the coefficients are smaller compared to 
strengths except for Community, Environment and Product. Overall the results suggest that 
there is no consistent and robust difference between high and low CSR firms in terms of their 
two year ahead forecasted profitability. 
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However, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 are based on short term forecasts, and investment 
in CSR may be expected to pay off only in the long run (Barnett and Salomon, 2012).  Table 
7 reports the results of the analysis of long term growth rates implied by analysts’ forecasts of 
earnings and current stock prices. Note that in some cases we cannot solve for an implied 
growth rate, typically because the forecasted year 2 abnormal earnings is negative, but in 
some cases because the present value of the residual income (for one and two years ahead) 
plus book value already exceeds the current share price.  Consequently, we eliminate such 
firms from our sample, leaving a sample of 10,437 firm-years for which we can feasibly 
compute an implied long run growth rate. Given that such estimates are inherently noisy, we 
Winsorise our implied growth rates at the 2.5 percent level.19  In interpreting these implied 
long run growth estimates, it is important to bear in mind that any short term growth in 
earnings (and hence abnormal earnings or residual income) have already been embedded in 
the valuation expression, as the g we are now solving for is the growth rate to infinity in 
abnormal earnings (i.e. earnings in excess of that expected given the cost of capital) beyond 
year 2. 
Insert Table 7 here 
 Using log assets as control for firm size,  accounting for intangibles, leverage and industry 
effects, the long run growth rates implied by analysts’ consensus forecasts are significantly 
higher for `Green’ firms for all CSR dimensions except  for Diversity and Employee. Whilst 
‘Toxic’ firms have lower implied growth for every dimension, the difference is insignificant 
except in the case of Community. However, the F-test for differences between Green and 
Toxic implied growth is significant for all dimensions except Employee. The results are 
robust to alternative definition of firm size as the differences seen with total assets as size 
control still retain their significance, as they do when no controls are employed.  Considering 
the number of strengths and concerns, we note that concerns are negatively related to long 
term growth and in all cases except Employee and Product are significantly so. For Product 
and Overall the strengths are significantly positively related to long term forecasted growth 
and concerns are  significantly negatively related to the long term forecasted growth. The 
evidence from Table 7 is that in the long run, abnormal earnings are more persistent in high 
CSR firms, suggesting that they are expected to enjoy a long run competitive advantage 
compared to low CSR firms.20   
                                                             
19 Although our results are robust to Winsorising at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. 
20 Other studies (in particular, El Ghoul et al. 2011) implement (6) by solving for re rather than g.  This requires 
g to be held constant across all firms.  If we do so, the results are striking, with ‘Green’ firms having the lowest 
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Finally, in Table 8 we show the result of solving the Easton et al. (2002) regression described 
in (9). Recall that we estimate this model by forming portfolios each year on the basis of CSR 
category and Fama-French 10 industry membership, and derive simultaneous estimates of the 
long run annualised growth in the base period (first two year) residual income and the cost of 
equity.  The main estimates in the Table show the effect of regressing these growth and cost 
of equity estimates on controls for size (log of assets and, alternatively, log of sales), leverage 
and R&D.  The ‘Neutral’ category is the base estimate, with ‘Green’, ‘Grey’ and ‘Toxic’ 
dummy variables capturing the differences between the estimates for these categories and the 
‘Neutral’ category.  We then report the results of an F-test on whether the difference between 
‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ coefficients are significant, together with a second F-test on whether the 
difference is significant when log of sales is used as the size control (reported as ‘Green-
Toxic’[S]).  Finally, we show the result of a simple test on whether the “raw” estimates of 
growth and ICEC differ between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms (reported in the Table as ‘Green-
Toxic’[NC]).  Panel A shows the regressions for implied growth, and Panel B shows the 
regressions for the implied equity cost of capital.  Finally, recognising that ultimately it is the 
combined effect of cost of equity and growth that drive any valuation, Panel C shows the 
results of performing the same tests on ICEC minus implied growth.  In each panel, figures in 
parentheses under row differences are p-values, calculated using simple t-tests for differences 
in the raw estimates and cluster robust estimates for the regression tests. 
Insert Table 8 here 
The results broadly support the conclusions from the earlier analysis.  When we turn to 
implied growth, in Panel A, we find far stronger effects for growth than for the cost of equity, 
reported in Panel B.  For the raw results, apart from Diversity, where growth is lower for 
‘Green’ firms, growth is higher for ‘Green’ firms compared to ‘Toxic’ firms all categories of 
CSR by between 0.5% (Employee) and 3.8% (Environment).  Overall, growth is higher by 
0.8% in ‘Green’ firms compared to ‘Toxic’ firms.  Once size, R&D expenditure, and leverage 
is controlled for, growth is significantly higher for Employee, Environment, Product, and 
Overall, but lower for Diversity and with no significant difference for Community. This 
result, where log assets are the control for size, is robust when we use log sales as control for 
size. Last, the dummy variables in the regression suggest that the growth differences 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
ICC for all categories of CSR except Diversity (where ‘Neutral’ firms have the lowest, and ‘Toxic’ firms have 
the highest, except in the case of Community where ‘Grey’ firms have a marginally higher ICC.  Full results are 
available from the authors on request. 
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compared with ‘Neutral’ firms are generally driven by the poor growth prospects of ‘Toxic’ 
firms, which are significantly negative in every case except Diversity.  ‘Grey’ firms have 
lower growth prospects than ‘Neutral’ firms for Employee, Environment and Overall 
dimensions.  Compared to ‘Neutral’ firms, ‘Green’ firms have better growth prospects for 
Diversity and Overall dimensions, but worse prospects for Community and Product 
dimensions. 
 
We note that from Panel B, whilst there are significant differences in cost of equity, even net 
of controls, they are in differing directions.  ‘Green’ firms on the Diversity dimension have a 
lower cost of equity than ‘Toxic’ firms, but ‘Green’ firms on an Environmental dimension 
have a higher cost of capital than ‘Toxic’ firms.  For the Overall dimension, the cost of equity 
is approximately 0.2% on a raw (no controls) basis, but there are no significant differences 
between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ firms when size, leverage and R&D are controlled for.  Finally, 
looking at the differences between categories compared to ‘Neutral’ firms, we again observe 
no clear patterns across differing dimension of CSR.  For Overall, the implied cost of equity 
for ‘Toxic’ firms is about 0.3% higher than for ‘Neutral’ firms, but ‘Green’ firms do not have 
a cost of equity significantly different from ‘Neutral’ firms. Taken as a whole, then, the 
results from Panel A and Panel B confirm our earlier findings that growth differences seem 
more important than cost of capital differences in explaining valuations. 
 
Of course, given these are expected returns and growth rates in the residual income expected 
at the time when the forecasts are made, ultimately what matters for the valuation is the 
difference between the cost of equity and growth, i.e. the combined effect of re-g in the 
terminal value expression which appears as the final term on the RHS of (9).  Ceteris paribus, 
a smaller difference between the cost of equity and growth implies a higher valuation.  Panel 
C shows that these differences are consistent with the valuation results from Tables 2 and 3.  
Results using no controls and using control (with alternative definitions for size) all show that 
the difference between cost of equity and growth is smaller for ‘Green’ firms than ‘Toxic’  
firms. As in the case of growth, primarily the effect seems to come about because of the 
adverse valuation of ‘Toxic’ firms (compared to ‘Neutral’ firms), although for Diversity, 
Environment and Overall there is a positive valuation effect for ‘Green’ firms compared to 
‘Neutral’ firms. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This paper has argued that analysing valuation provides the single important indicator of how 
markets view CSR activity, as it captures both expected future cash flow effects and expected 
cost of capital effects.  
 
Our first contribution has been to extend the analysis in Gregory and Whittaker (forthcoming) 
by presenting a model that separately estimates the stock market’s valuation of CSR strengths 
and concerns across multiple dimensions.  We further extend the analysis by employing the 
Fernando et al. (2010) classification of firms in each dimension into ‘Green’, ‘Grey’, 
‘Neutral’ and ‘Toxic’ categories.  Separating out strengths and concerns reveals that strengths 
(or ‘Greenness’) are significantly positively valued across Employee, and Product 
dimensions, with the result for Diversity only being significant when ‘Greenness’ is used to 
define the dimension.  By contrast, concerns (or ‘Toxicity’) reduce value in all dimensions, 
except Product dimensions although the Diversity effect differs according to how the 
dimension is defined, with concerns being negatively valued but the effect being insignificant 
when the ‘Toxicity’ categorisation is used to define the dimension. For our combined Overall 
dimension, strengths are positively valued, weaknesses are negatively valued, being ‘Green’ 
adds value, whilst being ‘Toxic’ detracts from value.   
 
So far, this is a simple extension of Gregory and Whittaker (forthcoming), but our second and 
main contribution is to analyse the source of these valuation differences.  As we have argued, 
a higher valuation of CSR can arise either because such firms are expected to be more 
profitable in the short run, or they are expected to be more profitable in the long run, or they 
have a lower cost of capital.  We attempt to disaggregate these effects in a number of ways.  
First, we employed an asset pricing model framework to investigate whether high CSR firms 
had lower factor exposures than low CSR firms.  Consistent with Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008) we find that in general high performance in CSR terms is associated with lower risk 
factor loadings.  However, with the exception of the Environment dimension, these lower 
factor loadings seem to be principally attributable to industry effects.  Furthermore, whilst 
significant, such factor loading differences lead to a smaller economic impact on the implied 
cost of equity capital.  This led us to explore the impact that CSR might have on future 
expected cash flows and profits.   
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To investigate this, we analysed IBES forecasts of future profitability and found little robust 
evidence that one and two year ahead forecasted ROE differences depend on CSR, once 
industry membership, size, leverage and R&D are controlled for.   Next, we solved the long 
run residual income (or abnormal earnings) model of Lee et al. (1999) for implied long run 
growth whilst holding industry cost of capital constant across different CSR portfolios within 
each year. We find that on a control-adjusted basis there is evidence that the implied long run 
growth is greater for ‘Green’ firms than ‘Toxic’ firms across all the dimensions of CSR 
except the Employee dimension, as well as for our overall CSR indicators. For this Overall 
dimension, strengths are associated with better implied growth prospects and concerns are 
associated with lower implied growth estimates.  These results are consistent with ‘Green’ 
firms being expected to enjoy a sustained competitive advantage with a longer run of 
abnormal earnings than low CSR firms.  Finally, we estimated the Easton et al. (2002) model, 
which simultaneously solves for implied growth and implied cost of equity, and confirmed 
that, in general, growth effects seem more important than cost of equity effects.   
 
Taken as a whole, our results show that markets positively value most aspects of CSR, and do 
so because in the long run, measured across most dimensions, high CSR firms have a higher 
expected growth rate in their abnormal earnings. In addition, although such firms might 
appear to have a lower cost of equity, this seems to be primarily due to industry effects rather 
than CSR strategy.  These significant valuation effects have important implications for 
corporate managers, fund managers and other investors.  As noted by Barber (2007, p.78) 
‘institutional shareholder activism designed to improve shareholder value should be well 
grounded in scientific evidence’.   In providing evidence, derived from a robust model, that 
positive CSR is rewarded with increased valuations, and that the avoidance of exposures to 
some concerns is also rewarded, we provide justification for both managers and investors to 
engage in such strategies.    
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Table 1. Pearson Correlation Coefficients and Summary Statistics 
 
Variables comstr comcon divstr divcon empstr empcon envstr envcon prostr procon overstr overcon PPS BVPS NIPS RDPS LOGsal LOGAss LTDTA 
comstr 1.00 
            
   
   comcon 0.14 1.00 
           
   
   divstr 0.44 0.17 1.00 
          
   
   divcon -0.09 -0.01 -0.17 1.00 
         
   
   empstr 0.26 0.19 0.30 -0.06 1.00 
        
   
   empcon 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.08 0.07 1.00 
       
   
   envstr 0.20 0.16 0.24 -0.08 0.30 0.11 1.00 
      
   
   envcon 0.15 0.33 0.14 -0.05 0.29 0.21 0.35 1.00 
      
  
   prostr 0.14 0.01 0.19 -0.05 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.05 1.00 
     
  
   procon 0.26 0.22 0.34 -0.03 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.29 0.09 1.00 
    
  
   overstr 0.66 0.23 0.82 -0.16 0.64 0.12 0.53 0.30 0.41 0.36 1.00 
        overcon 0.18 0.49 0.22 0.29 0.26 0.59 0.29 0.73 0.06 0.61 0.33 1.00 
       PPS 0.09 0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.11 0.07 1.00 
    BVPS 0.07 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.78 1.00   
   NIPS 0.10 0.11 0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.77 0.72 1.00 
    RDPS 0.11 -0.04 0.10 -0.05 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.02 1.00 
   LOGsal 0.36 0.24 0.38 -0.15 0.33 0.16 0.28 0.41 0.18 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.11 1.00 
  LOGAss 0.42 0.30 0.40 -0.16 0.29 0.08 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.41 0.49 0.36 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.01 0.80 1.00 
 LTDTA -0.05 0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.11 -0.03 0.03 -0.02 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.14 0.19 1.00 
              
   
   Mean 0.21 0.10 0.58 0.32 0.30 0.39 0.15 0.31 0.08 0.26 1.32 1.38 34.42 15.43 1.75 0.41 20.80 7.73 0.19 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 27.75 11.84 1.44 0.00 20.82 7.65 0.15 
Max 5.00 3.00 7.00 2.00 5.00 4.00 4.00 6.00 3.00 4.00 21.00 13.00 2345.00 1176.90 202.94 13.00 26.78 14.60 0.97 
Min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.04 -55.05 0.00 9.21 1.68 0.00 
Sd 0.56 0.32 1.02 0.48 0.61 0.61 0.45 0.78 0.29 0.60 1.96 1.60 46.03 24.50 4.23 0.95 1.84 1.81 0.18 
 
 
The Table shows Pearson correlations and summary statistics for the following variables: Comstr, Comcon the KLD CSR measures for community relations strengths and concerns, respectively; 
Divstr, Divcon, the KLD CSR measures for diversity indicator strengths and concerns, respectively; Empstr, Empcon, the net KLD CSR measure for employee relations indicator strengths and 
concerns, respectively; Envstr, Envcon the net KLD CSR measure for environmental indicator strengths and concerns, respectively;  Prodstr, Procon, the net KLD CSR measure for product 
indicator strengths and concerns;  Overstr – overall strength measured as the sum of strengths across all CSR indicators, Overcon-Overall concern  measured as the sum of concerns across all 
CSR indicators respectively; PPS, the end June market price per share; BVPS, the book value per share; NIPS, the net income per share;  RDPS, the Research and Development Expenditure per 
share ; LOGass, the natural log of Total Assets; LOGsal, the natural log of Sales and LTDTA, leverage-measured as the ratio of long term debt to total assets; Where the RDPS figures are not 
available in COMPUSTAT, they are assumed to be zero.  
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Table 2: Regressions of price on KLD strengths and concerns  
 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
BVPS 0.892*** 0.895*** 0.895*** 0.892*** 0.896*** 0.896*** 
 (9.93) (9.83) (9.92) (9.91) (9.92) (9.86) 
NIPS 4.505*** 4.496*** 4.490*** 4.502*** 4.482*** 4.493*** 
 (6.29) (6.28) (6.28) (6.31) (6.26) (6.27) 
LTDTA -4.059 -3.621 -3.746 -4.356 -3.500 -3.612 
 (-1.45) (-1.27) (-1.30) (-1.51) (-1.24) (-1.24) 
LOGass 1.630*** 1.351*** 1.541*** 1.770*** 1.375*** 1.529*** 
 (4.56) (3.82) (4.08) (4.57) (3.22) (3.64) 
RDPS 2.521** 2.497** 2.503** 2.653** 2.279** 2.443** 
 (2.19) (2.20) (2.20) (2.29) (2.01) (2.15) 
comstr 0.210      
 (0.31)      
comcon -1.677*      
 (-1.90)      
divstr  0.524     
  (1.25)     
divcon  -1.362**     
  (-2.11)     
empstr   0.934*    
   (1.74)    
empcon   -1.887***    
   (-2.86)    
envstr    0.440   
    (0.73)   
envcon    -1.557***   
    (-3.63)   
prostr     7.561***  
     (3.30)  
procon     -0.341  
     (-0.60)  
overstr      0.670*** 
      (3.39) 
overcon      -1.095*** 
      (-3.80) 
Intercept 9.978 11.896 11.054 10.310 11.657 12.424 
 (1.20) (1.48) (1.38) (1.24) (1.52) (1.58) 
Industry controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 16758 16758 16758 16758 16758 16758 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.710 0.710 0.711 0.710 0.712 0.711 
 
 
The Table shows the result of regressing June price of year t on net book value (BVPS) and net income (NIPS) for financial 
year ended t-1, together with Research and Development Expenditures (RDPS), Leverage – ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets (LTDTA), log Total Assets (LOGass) and the  KLD strength and concern  indicators. t-statistics computed using cluster 
robust standard errors from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen (2009) are shown in parentheses. All regressions 
include dummy variables reflecting membership of the Fama-French 48 industry groups. . *, ** and *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic  and shows the 
overall significance of the regression model. 
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Table 3: Regressions of price on categories based on KLD strengths and concerns 
 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
BVPS 0.893*** 0.895*** 0.896*** 0.893*** 0.893*** 0.894*** 
 
(9.94) (9.86) (9.90) (9.87) (9.90) (9.89) 
NIPS 4.505*** 4.495*** 4.489*** 4.501*** 4.495*** 4.498*** 
 
(6.28) (6.29) (6.28) (6.30) (6.27) (6.30) 
LTDTA -3.862 -3.629 -3.601 -3.976 -3.857 -3.593 
 
(-1.40) (-1.30) (-1.29) (-1.40) (-1.37) (-1.30) 
LOGass 1.575*** 1.386*** 1.441*** 1.608*** 1.588*** 1.490*** 
 
(4.68) (4.04) (4.15) (4.57) (4.00) (4.19) 
RDPS 2.522** 2.495** 2.469** 2.569** 2.442** 2.494** 
 
(2.20) (2.18) (2.18) (2.26) (2.12) (2.18) 
comgrn 0.545 
     
 
(0.50) 
     comtox -2.064** 
     
 
(-2.00) 
     divgrn 
 
1.517** 
    
  
(2.16) 
    divtox 
 
-0.911 
    
  
(-1.26) 
    empgrn 
  
2.222*** 
   
   
(2.67) 
   emptox 
  
-1.678** 
   
   
(-2.03) 
   envgrn 
   
0.812 
  
    
(0.78) 
  envtox 
   
-1.705* 
  
    
(-1.96) 
  progrn 
    
7.314** 
 
     
(2.40) 
 protox 
    
-1.100 
 
     
(-1.22) 
 overgrn 
     
1.927*** 
      
(2.93) 
overtox 
     
-1.012** 
      
(-2.11) 
Intercept 10.079 11.305 11.443 10.262 10.416 10.967 
 
(1.21) (1.44) (1.45) (1.25) (1.33) (1.36) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 16758 16758 16758 16758 16758 16758 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.710 0.710 0.711 0.710 0.711 0.710 
 
 
The Table shows the result of regressing June price of year t on net book value (BVPS) and net income (NIPS) for financial 
year ended t-1, together with Research and Development Expenditures (RDPS), Leverage – ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets (LTDTA), log Total Assets (LOGass) and dummy variables for the KLD strength and concern indicators defined using 
the Fernando et al. (2010) classifications for each CSR indicator.  For each CSR indicator firms are classified as ‘Green’ (grn) 
if they have only strengths, and ‘Toxic’ (tox) if they have only weaknesses. t-statistics computed using cluster robust 
standard errors from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen (2009) are shown in parentheses..   All regressions include 
dummy variables reflecting membership of the Fama-French 48 industry groups. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic  and shows the overall 
significance of the regression model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Table 4: Realised Return Regressions for portfolios of  ‘Green’ stocks and ‘Toxic’ stocks for each CSR Indicator 
 
Panel A : equally weighted  ‘Green’ stocks portfolio 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
rm-rf 1.014*** 1.132*** 1.124*** 1.040*** 1.121*** 1.114*** 
 (29.71) (31.68 ) (34.70) (24.88) (27.46) (32.72) 
smb 0.064 0.132*** 0.153*** 0.208*** 0.236*** 0.175*** 
 (1.48) (2.70) (2.83) (3.21) (3.54) (3.46) 
hml 0.567*** 0.458*** 0.425*** 0.496*** 0.355*** 0.462*** 
 (13.03) ( 8.70) (8.58) (7.39) (6.12) ( 9.31) 
Intercept -0.002 -0.028 0.011 -0.035 0.080 -0.023 
 (-0.02) (-0.25) (0.10) (-0.25) ( 0.60) (-0.22) 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.881 0.900 0.914 0.841 0.866 0.903 
Panel B : equally weighted ‘Toxic’ stocks portfolio 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
rm-rf 1.052*** 1.183*** 1.212*** 1.101*** 1.042*** 1.146*** 
 (24.67) (27.89) (25.32) (22.56) (29.45) (28.70) 
smb 0.073 0.304*** 0.212*** 0.065 0.014 0.186*** 
 (0.98) (4.01) (2.93) (1.02) (0.28) (2.74) 
hml 0.700*** 0.479*** 0.529*** 0.701*** 0.572*** 0.609*** 
 (9.64) (6.58) (6.72) ( 9.06) (9.96) (8.87) 
Intercept -0.116 -0.066 -0.144 -0.129 0.056 -0.165 
 (-0.63) (-0.42) (-0.90) (-0.84) (0.47) (-1.19) 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.767 0.853 0.848 0.833 0.884 0.871 
Panel C: equally weighted portfolios long in ‘Green’ stocks and short in ‘Toxic’ stocks 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
rm-rf -0.039 -0.051** -0.088*** -0.061* 0.079** -0.032 
 (-0.93) (-1.99) (-2.84) (-1.81) (2.46) (-1.28) 
smb -0.009 -0.171*** -0.059 0.143*** 0.222*** -0.011 
 (-0.18) (-3.70) (-1.41) ( 3.46) (5.13) (-0.31) 
hml -0.134** -0.021 -0.105** -0.205*** -0.216*** -0.147*** 
 (-2.12) (-0.50) (-2.08) (-4.55) (-4.86) ( -3.70) 
Intercept 0.114 0.038 0.155 0.094 0.025 0.141 
 (0.70) (0.32) (1.40) (0.75) (0.20) (1.54) 
Fp 0.200 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.004 
R2 0.037 0.134 0.085 0.214 0.369 0.124 
Panel D: Industry adjusted equally weighted portfolios long in ‘Green’ stocks and short in ‘Toxic’ stocks 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
rm-rf -0.057** 0.000 -0.038 -0.083*** -0.047 -0.024 
 (-2.00) (0.01) (-1.58) (-2.70) (-1.64) (-1.26) 
smb -0.098** -0.174*** -0.067* 0.036 0.082** -0.052* 
 (-2.47) (-4.75) (-1.89) (0.88) (2.13) (-1.97) 
hml 0.018 0.040 -0.065 -0.057 -0.125*** -0.036 
 ( 0.40) (1.13) (-1.52) (-1.49) (-2.69) (-1.25) 
Intercept 0.087 0.025 0.116 0.113 0.092 0.135* 
 (0.72) (0.24) ( 1.15) (1.04) (0.82) (1.84) 
Fp 0.003 0.000 0.033 0.025 0.000 0.070 
R2 0.079 0.175 0.045 0.054 0.102 0.041 
 
The table shows the results of the regression of the returns to a portfolio of stocks formed on the basis of their overall CSR 
strengths and concerns.  ‘Green’ stocks are those with only strengths and no concerns; ‘Toxic’ stocks are those with only 
concerns and no strengths.  Panel A, Panel B and Panel C shows the result of running simple stock portfolios minus the risk 
free rate as the dependent variable on the Fama-French three-factor model:
 
  pt+  1tptpftmtppftpt HMLhSMBsRRRR  . 
In 
Panel A, and Panel B the dependent variables are the returns on a portfolio long in green stocks, and long in toxic stocks 
respectively, minus the risk free rate.  In Panel C, the dependent variable is the return on a portfolio long in green and 
short in toxic stocks. Panel D shows the result of running industry adjusted portfolio returns on an industry-adjusted three 
factor model:   pt+  2tptpftmtpppjtpt HMLhSMBsRRRR 
 So in Panel D the dependent variable is the return on a portfolio long 
in green stocks and short in toxic stocks. In all the panels, the t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic  and 
shows the overall significance of the regression model. 
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Table 5: Differences in Analysts’ one year ahead Return on Equity Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Forecast ROE 1 year ahead by  categories based on  KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Green 0.015** 0.016*** 0.015*** -0.013** 0.011 0.008* 
 (2.28) (3.52) (3.34) (-1.99) (1.18) (1.79) 
Toxic 0.018*** 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.016*** 0.009** 
 (3.27) (0.83) (0.97) (0.87) (4.09) (1.96) 
Grey 0.036*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.013* 0.048*** 0.021*** 
 (4.01) (3.45) (3.02) (1.66) (5.61) (4.41) 
LOGass 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003** 0.001 0.002 
 (0.96) (1.08) (1.48) (2.12) (0.85) (1.24) 
LTDTA 0.024* 0.023* 0.022* 0.019 0.021 0.022 
 (1.75) (1.71) (1.67) (1.47) (1.60) (1.59) 
RDPS -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005* -0.004 
 (-1.55) (-1.57) (-1.59) (-1.53) (-1.74) (-1.51) 
Intercept 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.113** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.112** 
 (2.82) (2.78) (2.41) (2.90) (2.91) (2.44) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic -0.003 0.013*** 0.011* -0.017** -0.004 -0.001* 
Pval of diff 0.724 0.003 0.056 0.02 0.656 0.06 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.055 0.057 0.054 0.053 0.057 0.055 
N 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 
Green-Toxic  (NC) 0.000 0.018*** 0.014*** -0.016*** -0.009* 0.002 
Pval of diff 0.914 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.065 0.500 
Green-Toxic (S) -0.007 0.002 0.006 -0.012 0.001 -0.004 
Pval of diff 0.431 0.61 0.293 0.100 0.901 0.345 
 
Panel B: Forecast ROE 1 year ahead by KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Strength 0.009** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.003 0.020** 0.007*** 
 (2.37) (5.90) (4.08) (0.75) (2.57) (5.95) 
Concern 0.018*** 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.015*** 0.004*** 
 (3.35) (1.50) (1.58) (1.64) (5.64) (2.93) 
LOGass 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003* 0.000 -0.003 
 (0.91) (-0.26) (1.23) (1.93) (0.39) (-1.44) 
LTDTA 0.024* 0.026** 0.023* 0.02 0.024* 0.031** 
 (1.77) (1.99) (1.72) (1.49) (1.77) (2.40) 
RDPS -0.005 -0.005* -0.005 -0.005 -0.005* -0.006** 
 (-1.55) (-1.68) (-1.59) (-1.58) (-1.76) (-2.02) 
Intercept 0.125*** 0.136*** 0.114** 0.116*** 0.130*** 0.139*** 
 (2.85) (3.18) (2.44) (2.60) (2.92) (2.97) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.056 0.066 0.056 0.051 0.06 0.068 
N 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 
 
The table shows the differences in analyst’s one year ahead forecasted Return on Equity (ROE) by portfolios formed on the 
basis of strengths and concerns across CSR dimensions. The forecasted return on equity for period t + τ (where τ is 1) is 
computed as forecast EPS for period t + τ / book value of equity for period t + τ - 1. In Panel A portfolios are formed on the 
basis of firms with only positive CSR scores in that dimension and no negative scores in that dimension (‘Green’), firms with 
only negative CSR scores in that dimension and no positive scores in that dimension (‘Toxic’), together with firms with no 
scores (‘Neutral’) and mixed scores (‘Gray’) in that dimension . In Panel A Green-Toxic (NC) shows the results of a t-test  
(without controls variables)  for difference in mean analyst forecasted one year ahead ROE between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ 
groups. Green-Toxic(S) shows the results where LOGsal (natural logarithm of sales)  is used as a control for firm size instead 
of LOGass (Natural logarithm of Total Assets). Green-Toxic (NC) shows the difference between portfolios of ‘Green’ and 
‘Toxic’ stocks without any control variables.  For Green-Toxic (NC), the difference in mean is computed using a t-test for 
difference in means. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic and shows the overall significance of the 
regression model. In Panel B portfolios are formed on the basis of number of CSR strengths and concerns in that 
dimension.  LTDTA is Leverage, measured as the ratio of Long-term Debt to Total Assets (LTDTA), LOGass is the natural log 
 5 
of Total Assets and RDPS is the Research and Development expenditure per share.  t-statistics computed using cluster 
robust standard errors from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen (2009) are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively.   
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Table 6. Differences in Analysts’ two year ahead Return on Equity Forecasts 
 
Panel A: Forecast ROE two  years ahead by  categories based on  KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
green 0.012** 0.017*** 0.013*** -0.014** 0.006 0.007** 
 
(2.14) (4.63) (3.42) (-2.47) (0.78) (2.11) 
toxic 0.017*** 0.004 0.006** 0.004 0.015*** 0.009*** 
 
(3.74) (1.05) (2.06) (0.91) (4.33) (2.75) 
grey 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.021*** 0.013** 0.042*** 0.020*** 
 
(4.58) (4.33) (3.77) (2.14) (5.69) (5.05) 
LOGass -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(-1.26) (-1.09) (-0.65) (-0.02) (-1.17) (-0.88) 
LTDTA 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 
(3.45) (3.47) (3.39) (3.16) (3.26) (3.30) 
RDPS -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.005** 
 
(-2.17) (-2.27) (-2.22) (-2.17) (-2.38) (-2.14) 
Intercept 0.143*** 0.142*** 0.131*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 
 
(4.14) (4.21) (3.57) (4.47) (4.26) (3.69) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic -0.005 0.013*** 0.007 -0.018*** -0.008 -0.002 
Pval of diff 0.557 0.000 0.137 0.004 0.360 0.570 
N 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.064 0.068 0.063 0.061 0.066 0.064 
Green-Toxic (S) -0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.014** -0.004 -0.005 
Pval of diff 0.326 0.175 0.548 0.020 0.680 0.172 
Green-Toxic  (NC) -0.003 0.011*** 0.006*** -0.014*** -0.006 -0.003 
Pval of diff 0.413 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.118 0.164 
 
 
Panel B: Forecast ROE 2 year ahead by KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Strength 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.003 0.014** 0.006*** 
 
(2.68) (7.11) (4.51) (0.76) (2.25) (7.30) 
Concern 0.017*** 0.005 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.005*** 
 
(3.90) (1.63) (2.79) (2.59) (6.26) (3.98) 
LOGass -0.002 -0.004** -0.001 -0.000 -0.002* -0.006*** 
 
(-1.33) (-2.44) (-0.91) (-0.29) (-1.77) (-3.66) 
LTDTA 0.035*** 0.038** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.043*** 
 
(3.51) (3.82) (3.48) (3.20) (3.46) (4.36) 
RDPS -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.006** -0.007*** 
 
(-2.20) (-2.42) (-2.24) (-2.27) (-2.38) (-2.75) 
Intercept 0.145*** 0.156*** 0.132*** 0.137*** 0.148*** 0.157*** 
 
(4.22) (4.73) (3.59) (3.93) (4.22) (4.23) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 13089 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.065 0.080 0.066 0.059 0.069 0.083 
 
 
The table shows the differences in analyst’s two year ahead forecasted Return on Equity (ROE) by portfolios formed on the 
basis of strengths and concerns across CSR dimensions. The forecasted return on equity for period t + τ (where τ is 2) is 
computed as forecast EPS for period t + τ / book value of equity for period t + τ - 1. In Panel A portfolios are formed on the 
basis of firms with only positive CSR scores in that dimension and no negative scores in that dimension (‘Green’), firms with 
only negative CSR scores in that dimension and no positive scores in that dimension (‘Toxic’), together with firms with no 
scores (‘Neutral’) and mixed scores (‘Gray’) in that dimension . In Panel A Green-Toxic (NC) shows the results of a t-test  
(without controls variables)  for difference in mean analyst forecasted one year ahead ROE between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ 
groups. Green-Toxic(S) shows the results where LOGsales is used as a control for firm size instead of LOGass. Green-
Toxic(NC) shows the difference between portfolios of ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ stocks without any control variables.  In Green-
Toxic(NC), the difference in mean is computed using a t-test for difference in means. Fp reports the p-value corresponding 
to the F-statistic and shows the overall significance of the regression model. In Panel B portfolios are formed on the basis 
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of number of CSR strengths and concerns in that dimension.  LTDTA is Leverage, measured as the ratio of Long-term Debt 
to Total Assets (LTDTA), LOGass is the natural log of Total Assets and RDPS is the Research and Development expenditure 
per share.  t-statistics computed using cluster robust standard errors from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen 
(2009) are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively.   
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Table 7: Implied Long term Growth Estimates by CSR Category 
 
Panel A: Implied Long-term Growth by categories based on  KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Green 0.0125* 0.004 0.003 0.012* 0.025*** 0.0185*** 
 (1.65) (0.83) (0.67) (1.74) (3.78) (4.28) 
Toxic -0.0120* -0.007 -0.004 -0.011 -0.005 0.001 
 (-1.76) (-1.18) (-0.63) (-1.54) (-0.81) (0.16) 
Grey -0.013 -0.013 -0.009 -0.012 0.011 0.007 
 (-1.53) (-1.45) (-0.81) (-1.57) -1.5 (1.07) 
LOGass -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (-1.28) (-1.26) (-0.93) (-0.80) (-1.09) (-1.34) 
LTDTA -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.052*** 
 (-6.17) (-5.67) (-5.66) (-6.03) (-5.83) (-5.53) 
RDPS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 -0.31 -0.41 -0.49 -0.63 -0.37 (0.31) 
Intercept -0.038 -0.032 -0.037 -0.047 -0.038 -0.038 
 (-0.59) (-0.50) (-0.60) (-0.71) (-0.59) (-0.60) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic 0.024* 0.011*** 0.007 0.023** 0.029*** .0170** 
Pval of diff 0.064 0.000 0.388 0.017 0.004 0.021 
N 10437 10437 10437 10437 10437 10437 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.13 0.129 0.128 0.129 0.130 0.130 
Green-Toxic (S) 0.024* 0.008*** 0.005 0.024** 0.030*** 0.0160** 
Pval of diff 0.077 0.010 0.532 0.015 0.003 0.0369 
Green-Toxic  (NC) 0.028*** -0.002 0.000 0.032*** 0.053*** 0.012*** 
Pval of diff 0.000 0.439 0.896 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
Panel B: Implied Long-term Growth by categories based on  KLD strengths and concerns 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Strength 0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.019*** 0.002** 
 (1.35) (-0.28) (-0.55) (0.64) (3.42) (2.06) 
Concern -0.013** -0.010** -0.007 -0.006** -0.005 -0.005** 
 (-1.99) (-2.05) (-1.19) (-2.32) (-1.31) (-2.1) 
LOGass -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (-1.26) (-1.03) (-0.74) (-0.7) (-0.91) (-0.48) 
LTDTA -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.056*** 
 (-6.17) (-5.6) (-5.75) (-5.98) (-5.77) (-5.59) 
RDPS 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.31) (0.43) (0.53) (0.69) (0.34) (0.52) 
Intercept -0.037 0.032 -0.039 -0.044 -0.040 -0.038 
 (-0.59) (-0.49) (-0.62) (-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.59) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
N 10437 10437 10437 10437 10437 10437 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.1291 0.1284 0.1282 0.1281 0.1297 0.1311 
 
The table shows the differences in the implied growth parameter from equation (9) in the text by portfolios formed on the 
basis of strengths and concerns across CSR dimensions. In Panel A portfolios are formed on the basis of firms with only 
positive CSR scores in that dimension and no negative scores in that dimension (‘Green’), firms with only negative CSR 
scores in that dimension and no positive scores in that dimension (‘Toxic’), together with firms with no scores (‘Neutral’) 
and mixed scores (‘Gray’) in that dimension . In Panel A Green-Toxic (NC) shows the results of a t-test  (without controls 
variables)  for difference in the implied growth between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ groups. Green-Toxic(S) shows the results where 
LOGsales is used as a control for firm size instead of LOGass. Green-Toxic(NC) shows the difference between portfolios of 
‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ stocks without any control variables.  In Green-Toxic(NC), the difference in mean is computed using a t-
test for difference in means. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic and shows the overall significance of the 
regression model. In Panel B portfolios are formed on the basis of number of CSR strengths and concerns in that 
dimension.  LTDTA is Leverage, measured as the ratio of Long-term Debt to Total Assets (LTDTA), LOGass is the natural log 
of Total Assets and RDPS is the Research and Development expenditure per share.  t-statistics computed using cluster 
 9 
robust standard errors from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen (2009) are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively. 
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Table 8. Simultaneously derived implied growth and implied cost of equity capital estimates, based on Easton et al. 
(2002) 
 
Panel A- Implied Growth 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Green -0.025*** 0.010*** -0.002 0.001 -0.014*** 0.004* 
 
(-10.07) (10.18) (-1.17) (0.48) (-4.24) (1.92) 
Grey 0.033 0.002 -0.011** -0.041*** -0.005 -0.006*** 
 
(1.03) (0.40) (-2.37) (-9.82) (-0.82) (-3.49) 
Toxic -0.030*** 0.013*** -0.008*** -0.036*** -0.025*** -0.004** 
 
(-12.77) (10.02) (-5.88) (-17.21) (-12.07) (-2.18) 
LOGass -0.001** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-2.45) (-1.04) (-3.29) (-0.77) (-4.76) (-4.54) 
LTDTA -0.015*** -0.014*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015*** 
 
(-2.77) (-4.70) (-7.28) (-5.87) (-7.63) (-5.08) 
RDPS -0.000 0.002* 0.002** 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 
(-0.17) (1.67) (2.09) (1.32) (0.63) (1.12) 
Intercept 0.092*** 0.075*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.092*** 0.090*** 
 
(27.97) (29.54) (32.74) (40.88) (47.52) (33.06) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic 0.005 -0.003** 0.006*** 0.037*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
Pval of diff 0.128 0.025 0.002  0.000  0.003 0.000 
N 12051 12134 12048 11687 11221 10669 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.015 0.014 0.009 0.072 0.041 0.011 
Green-Toxic (S) 0.005 -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.037*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 
Pval of diff 0.126 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.000 
Green-Toxic  (NC) 0.006 -0.003** 0.005*** 0.038*** 0.013*** 0.008*** 
Pval of diff 0.081 0.011 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 
 
Panel B. Implied Cost of Equity capital 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Green -0.015*** 0.009*** 0.001 -0.007*** -0.012*** 0.002 
 
(-9.39) (12.70) (0.88) (-4.25) (-5.84) (1.53) 
Grey 0.013 0.011*** 0.000 -0.029*** -0.011 0.000 
 
(0.81) (3.92) (0.08) (-8.72) (-1.57) (0.06) 
Toxic -0.018*** 0.014*** 0.000 -0.023*** -0.011*** 0.003** 
 
(-12.21) (15.99) (0.59) (-17.02) (-8.20) (2.28) 
LOGass -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(-7.01) (-7.98) (-9.53) (-8.37) (-12.70) (-11.21) 
LTDTA -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.015*** -0.013*** 
 
(-4.24) (-5.30) (-7.54) (-5.12) (-7.98) (-6.43) 
RDPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.19) (1.41) (1.02) (2.65) (-0.61) (0.91) 
Intercept 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.134*** 0.131*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
 
(69.61) (72.04) (71.48) (96.18) (92.93) (72.76) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic 0.002 -0.005*** 0.000 0.0156*** -0.000 -0.001 
Pval of diff 0.271 0.000 0.7437 0.000 0.716 0.605 
N 12053 12134 12054 11690 11228 10671 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.022 0.036 0.012 0.075 0.042 0.020 
Green-Toxic (S) 0.002 -0.007*** -0.000 0.016*** -0.000 -0.002 
Pval of diff 0.304 0.000 0.776 0.000 0.883 0.207 
Green-Toxic  (NC) 0.002 -0.008*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.001 -0.002* 
Pval of diff 0.2241 0.0000 0.1585  0.0000  0.5341 0.0694  
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Panel C. R-G Differences 
Variable Community Diversity Employee Environment Product Overall 
Green 0.010*** -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.001 -0.002** 
 (9.12) (-3.34) (3.97) (-7.01) (0.98) (-2.20) 
Grey -0.017 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (-1.06) (4.96) (6.87) (9.27) (2.73) (7.96) 
Toxic 0.013*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.007*** 
 (11.01) (1.60) (14.21) (13.15) (14.89) (8.42) 
LOGass -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (-3.77) (-10.80) (-6.79) (-10.58) (-11.55) (-7.98) 
LTDTA 0.003 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.002* 
 (1.17) (2.78) (4.73) (5.23) (4.40) (1.91) 
RDPS 0.000 -0.000* -0.001** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.51) (-1.75) (-2.47) (0.18) (-1.04) (-1.12) 
Intercept 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 
 (26.32) (44.86) (33.83) (44.33) (53.24) (37.27) 
Industry Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Green-Toxic -0.003* -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.009*** 
Pval of diff 0.0814 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 12051 12134 12048 11687 11221 10669 
Fp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.010 0.020 0.028 0.060 0.047 0.032 
Green-Toxic (S) -0.003* -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.021*** -0.012*** -0.01*** 
Pval of diff 0.0645 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Green-Toxic  (NC) -0.003* -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.02*** -0.012*** -0.01*** 
Pval of diff 0.0348 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
The Table reports  the result of solving the Easton et al. (2002) regression described in (10) for portfolios sorted on year, 
Fama-French 10 industry group, and portfolios formed on the basis of formed of firms with only positive CSR scores in that 
dimension and no negative scores in that dimension (‘Green’), firms with only negative CSR scores in that dimension and 
no positive scores in that dimension (‘Toxic’), together with firms with no scores (‘Neutral’) and mixed scores (‘Gray’) in 
that dimension.  In the Panels Green-Toxic (NC) shows the results of a t-test  (without controls variables)  for difference in 
the implied growth between ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ groups. Green-Toxic(S) shows the results where LOGsales is used as a 
control for firm size instead of LOGass. Green-Toxic(NC) shows the difference between portfolios of ‘Green’ and ‘Toxic’ 
stocks without any control variables.  In Green-Toxic(NC), the difference in mean is computed using a t-test for difference 
in means. Fp reports the p-value corresponding to the F-statistic and shows the overall significance of the regression model. 
In Panel B portfolios are formed on the basis of number of CSR strengths and concerns in that dimension.  LTDTA is 
Leverage, measured as the ratio of Long-term Debt to Total Assets (LTDTA), LOGass is the natural log of Total Assets and 
RDPS is the Research and Development expenditure per share.  t-statistics computed using cluster robust standard errors 
from the two-way cluster approach of Petersen (2009) are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% percent level respectively. 
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Appendix A 
 
Dimension Strengths Concerns 
 Community Generous giving Investment Controversies  
  Innovative giving Negative Economic Impact  
   Support for housing Indigenous Peoples Relations 
   Support for education (added in 1994) Tax Disputes  
   Indigenous peoples relations strength (2000–2002) Other Concern 
   Non-U.S. charitable giving 
    Volunteer programmes strength (added 2005) 
 
   Other strength 
 
 Diversity  CEO 
Employee discrimination (renamed from 
controversies 
   Promotion 2007 Aug) 
   Board of directors  Non-representation 
   Family benefits  Other concern 
   Women/minority contracting   
   Employment of the disabled   
   Progressive gay/lesbian policies (added in 1995)   
   Other strength   
 Employee  Union relations strength  Union relations concern 
   No layoff policy (through 1994) 
 Health and safety concern (renamed from 
safety 
   Cash profit sharing   controversies in 2003) 
 
Employee Involvement  Workforce reductions 
   Strong retirement benefits  Pension/benefits concern (added in 1992) 
   Health and safety strength (added in 2003)  Other concern 
   Other strength 
 
 Environment  Beneficial products and services  Hazardous waste 
   Pollution prevention  Regulatory problems 
   Recycling  Ozone depleting chemicals 
   Alternative fuels  Substantial emissions 
   Property, plant, and equipment (through 1995)  Agricultural chemicals 
   Management systems (added 2006)  Climate change (added in 1999) 
   Other strength  Other concern 
 Product  Quality  Product safety 
   R&D/innovation  Marketing/contracting controversy 
   Benefits to economically disadvantaged  Antitrust 
   Other strength  Other concern 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
